PHOTO ANCIENNE 1965 vendu ORIGINALE CHEIKH MOHAMMED ABDULLAH LION DU CACHEMIRE INDE

The Kashmir conflict is a territorial conflict over the Kashmir region, primarily between India and Pakistan, with China playing a third-party role.[1][2] The conflict started after the partition of India in 1947 as both India and Pakistan claimed the entirety of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. It is a dispute over the region that escalated into three wars between India and Pakistan and several other armed skirmishes. India controls approximately 45% of the land area of the region that includes Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, most of Ladakh, the Siachen Glacier[3] and 70% of its population; Pakistan controls approximately 35% of the land area that includes Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan; and China controls the remaining 20% of the land area that includes the Aksai Chin region, the mostly uninhabited Trans-Karakoram Tract, and part of the Demchok sector.[4][5][6][7][8][9][10] After the partition of India and a rebellion in the western districts of the state, Pakistani tribal militias invaded Kashmir, leading the Hindu ruler of Jammu and Kashmir to join India.[11] The resulting Indo-Pakistani War ended with a UN-mediated ceasefire along a line that was eventually named the Line of Control.[12][13] After further fighting in the wars of 1965 and 1971, the Simla Agreement formally established the Line of Control between the two nations controlled territories.[14][15] In 1999, an armed conflict between India and Pakistan broke out again in Kargil with no effect on the status quo.[16]

Since 1989, Kashmiri protest movements were created to voice Kashmirs disputes and grievances with the Indian government in the Indian-controlled Kashmir Valley,[17][18] with some Kashmiri separatists in armed conflict with the Indian government based on the demand for self-determination.[17][18][19][20][21] The 2010s were marked by further unrest erupting within the Kashmir Valley. The 2010 Kashmir unrest began after an alleged fake encounter between local youth and security forces.[22] Thousands of youths pelted security forces with rocks, burned government offices, and attacked railway stations and official vehicles in steadily intensifying violence.[23] The Indian government blamed separatists and Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based militant group, for stoking the 2010 protests.[24] The 2016 Kashmir unrest erupted after killing of a Hizbul Mujahideen militant, Burhan Wani, by Indian security forces.[25] Further unrest in the region erupted after the 2019 Pulwama attack.[26]

According to scholars, Indian forces have committed many human rights abuses and acts of terror against the Kashmiri civilian population, including extrajudicial killing, rape, torture, and enforced disappearances.[20][27][28] According to Amnesty International, no member of the Indian military deployed in Jammu and Kashmir has been tried for human rights violations in a civilian court as of June 2015, although there have been military courts-martial held.[29] Amnesty International has also accused the Indian government of refusing to prosecute perpetrators of abuses in the region.[30]

Contents

1India–Pakistan conflict

2Internal conflict

321st century developments

4National stances

5Pakistans relation with militants

6Human rights abuses

7Map legality

8See also

9Notes

10Citations

11Bibliography

12Further reading

13External links

India–Pakistan conflict

Further information: Timeline of the Kashmir conflict

Background

See also: Jammu and Kashmir (princely state)

The Afghan Durrani Empire ruled Kashmir from 1752[31] until its 1819 conquest by the Sikh Empire under Ranjit Singh. The Raja of Jammu Gulab Singh, who was a vassal of the Sikh Empire and an influential noble in the Sikh court, sent expeditions to various border kingdoms and ended up encircling Kashmir by 1840. Following the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845–1846), Kashmir was ceded under the Treaty of Lahore to the East India Company, which transferred it to Gulab Singh through the Treaty of Amritsar, in return for the payment of indemnity owed by the Sikh empire. Gulab Singh took the title of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.

From 1846 till the 1947 partition of India, Kashmir was ruled by maharajas of Gulab Singhs Dogra dynasty, as a princely state under British Paramountcy. The British Raj managed the defence, external affairs, and communications for the princely state and stationed a British Resident in Srinagar to oversee the internal administration. According to the 1941 census, the states population was 77 percent Muslim, 20 percent Hindu and 3 percent others (Sikhs and Buddhists).[32] Despite its Muslim majority, the princely rule was an overwhelmingly a Hindu-dominated state.[33] The Muslim majority suffered under the high taxes of the administration and had few opportunities for growth and advancement.[34]

Partition and invasion

British rule in the Indian subcontinent ended in 1947 with the creation of new states: the dominions of Pakistan and India, as the successor states to British India. The British Paramountcy over the 562 Indian princely states ended. According to the Indian Independence Act 1947, "the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States".[35][36] States were thereafter left to choose whether to join India or Pakistan or to remain independent. Jammu and Kashmir, the largest of the princely states, had a predominantly Muslim population ruled by the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh. He decided to stay independent because he expected that the States Muslims would be unhappy with accession to India, and the Hindus and Sikhs would become vulnerable if he joined Pakistan.[37][38] On 11 August, the Maharaja dismissed his prime minister Ram Chandra Kak, who had advocated independence. Observers and scholars interpret this action as a tilt towards accession to India.[38][39] Pakistanis decided to preempt this possibility by wresting Kashmir by force if necessary.[40]

Pakistan made various efforts to persuade the Maharaja of Kashmir to join Pakistan. In July 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah is believed to have written to the Maharaja promising "every sort of favourable treatment," followed by the lobbying of the States Prime Minister by leaders of Jinnahs Muslim League party. Faced with the Maharajas indecision on accession, the Muslim League agents clandestinely worked in Poonch to encourage the local Muslims to an armed revolt, exploiting an internal unrest regarding economic grievances. The authorities in Pakistani Punjab waged a private war by obstructing supplies of fuel and essential commodities to the State. Later in September, Muslim League officials in the Northwest Frontier Province, including the Chief Minister Abdul Qayyum Khan, assisted and possibly organized a large-scale invasion of Kashmir by Pathan tribesmen.[41]:61[42] Several sources indicate that the plans were finalised on 12 September by the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, based on proposals prepared by Colonel Akbar Khan and Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan. One plan called for organising an armed insurgency in the western districts of the state and the other for organising a Pushtoon tribal invasion. Both were set in motion.[43][44]

The Jammu division of the state got caught up in the Partition violence. Large numbers of Hindus and Sikhs from Rawalpindi and Sialkot started arriving in March 1947, bringing "harrowing stories of Muslim atrocities." According to Ilyas Chattha, this provoked counter-violence on Jammu Muslims, which had "many parallels with that in Sialkot."[45] The violence in the eastern districts of Jammu that started in September, developed into a widespread massacre of Muslims around October, organised by the Hindu Dogra troops of the State and perpetrated by the local Hindus, including members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, and the Hindus and Sikhs displaced from the neighbouring areas of West Pakistan. The Maharaja himself was implicated in some instances. A large number of Muslims were killed. Others fled to West Pakistan, some of whom made their way to the western districts of Poonch and Mirpur, which were undergoing rebellion. Many of these Muslims believed that the Maharaja ordered the killings in Jammu which instigated the Muslims in West Pakistan to join the uprising in Poonch and help in the formation of the Azad Kashmir government.[46]

The rebel forces in the western districts of Jammu were organised under the leadership of Sardar Ibrahim, a Muslim Conference leader. They took control of most of the western parts of the State by 22 October. On 24 October, they formed a provisional Azad Kashmir (free Kashmir) government based in Palandri.[47]

Accession

The Instrument of Accession of Kashmir to India was accepted by the Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten.

Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, the Maharajas nominee for his next prime minister, visited Nehru and Patel in Delhi on 19 September 1947, requesting essential supplies which had been blockaded by Pakistan since the beginning of September. He communicated the Maharajas willingness to accede to India. Nehru, however, demanded that the jailed political leader, Sheikh Abdullah, be released from prison and involved in the state government. Only then would he allow the state to accede.[48][49] The Maharaja released Sheikh Abdullah on 29 September.[39]

The Maharajas troops could not withstand the tribal militia attack in September and October 1947; they were heavily outnumbered and outgunned by the tribal militias, and were also facing internal rebellions from Muslim troops. The Maharaja made an urgent plea to Delhi for military assistance. Upon the Governor General Lord Mountbattens insistence, India required the Maharaja to accede before it could send troops. Accordingly, the Maharaja signed an instrument of accession on 26 October 1947, which was accepted by the Governor General the next day.[50][51][52] While the Government of India accepted the accession, it added the proviso that it would be submitted to a "reference to the people" after the state is cleared of the invaders, since "only the people, not the Maharaja, could decide where Kashmiris wanted to live."; it was a provisional accession.[53][54][note 1] The largest political party, National Conference, headed by Sheikh Abdullah, endorsed the accession. In the words of the National Conference leader Syed Mir Qasim, India had the "legal" as well as "moral" justification to send in the army through the Maharajas accession and the peoples support of it.[55][note 2]

The Indian troops, which were airlifted in the early hours of 27 October, secured the Srinagar airport. The city of Srinagar was being patrolled by the National Conference volunteers with Hindus and Sikhs moving about freely among Muslims, an "incredible sight" to visiting journalists. The National Conference also worked with the Indian Army to secure the city.[56]

In the north of the state lay the Gilgit Agency, which had been leased by British India but returned to the Maharaja shortly before Independence. Gilgits population did not favour the States accession to India. Sensing their discontent, Major William Brown, the Maharajas commander of the Gilgit Scouts, mutinied on 1 November 1947, overthrowing the Governor Ghansara Singh. The bloodless coup detat was planned by Brown to the last detail under the code name "Datta Khel". Local leaders in Gilgit formed a provisional government (Aburi Hakoomat), naming Raja Shah Rais Khan as the president and Mirza Hassan Khan as the commander-in-chief. But, Major Brown had already telegraphed Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan asking Pakistan to take over. According to historian Yaqoob Khan Bangash, the provisional government lacked sway over the population which had intense pro-Pakistan sentiments.[57] Pakistans Political Agent, Khan Mohammad Alam Khan, arrived on 16 November and took over the administration of Gilgit.[58][59] According to various scholars, the people of Gilgit as well as those of Chilas, Koh Ghizr, Ishkoman, Yasin, Punial, Hunza and Nagar joined Pakistan by choice.[60][61][62][63]

Indo-Pakistani War of 1947

Main article: Indo-Pakistani War of 1947

Rebel forces from the western districts of the State and the Pakistani Pakhtoon tribesmen[note 3][note 4] made rapid advances into the Baramulla sector. In the Kashmir valley, National Conference volunteers worked with the Indian Army to drive out the raiders.[note 5] The resulting First Kashmir War lasted until the end of 1948.

The Pakistan army made available arms, ammunition and supplies to the rebel forces who were dubbed the "Azad Army". Pakistani army officers "conveniently" on leave and the former officers of the Indian National Army were recruited to command the forces. In May 1948, the Pakistani army officially entered the conflict, in theory to defend the Pakistan borders, but it made plans to push towards Jammu and cut the lines of communications of the Indian forces in the Mendhar valley.[64] C. Christine Fair notes that this was the beginning of Pakistan using irregular forces and "asymmetric warfare" to ensure plausible deniability, which has continued ever since.[65]

On 1 November 1947, Mountbatten flew to Lahore for a conference with Jinnah, proposing that, in all the princely States where the ruler did not accede to a Dominion corresponding to the majority population (which would have included Junagadh, Hyderabad as well as Kashmir), the accession should be decided by an "impartial reference to the will of the people". Jinnah rejected the offer. According to Indian scholar A. G. Noorani, Jinnah ended up squandering his leverage.[66]

Pakistani soldiers and tribesman captured Rajouri on 7 November 1947, which began the Rajouri Massacres of 30,000+ Hindus and Sikhs, locals and refugees from Partition. The massacres would only end with the Indian Army recapturing Rajouri in April 1948.[67]

On 25 November, the Pakistani tribesmen and soldiers attacked and took over Mirpur, and began the Mirpur Massacre of Hindus and Sikhs in the area. An estimated 20,000+ Hindus and Sikhs were killed overall. Rapes and other crimes were also committed during the aftermath.[68]

According to Jinnah, India acquired the accession through "fraud and violence".[69] A plebiscite was unnecessary and states should accede according to their majority population. He was willing to urge Junagadh to accede to India in return for Kashmir. For a plebiscite, Jinnah demanded simultaneous troop withdrawal for he felt that the average Muslim would never have the courage to vote for Pakistan in the presence of Indian troops and with Sheikh Abdullah in power. When Mountbatten countered that the plebiscite could be conducted by the United Nations, Jinnah, hoping that the invasion would succeed and Pakistan might lose a plebiscite, again rejected the proposal, stating that the Governors Generals should conduct it instead. Mountbatten noted that it was untenable given his constitutional position and India did not accept Jinnahs demand of removing Sheikh Abdullah.[70][note 6]

Prime Ministers Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan met again in December, when Nehru informed Khan of Indias intention to refer the dispute to the United Nations under article 35 of the UN Charter, which allows the member states to bring to the Security Council attention situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace.[71]

Nehru and other Indian leaders were afraid since 1947 that the "temporary" accession to India might act as an irritant to the bulk of the Muslims of Kashmir. V.P. Menon, Secretary in Patels Ministry of States, admitted in an interview in 1964 that India had been absolutely dishonest on the issue of plebiscite.[72] A.G. Noorani blames many Indian and Pakistani leaders for the misery of Kashmiri people but says that Nehru was the main culprit.[73]

UN mediation

Main article: UN mediation of the Kashmir dispute

India sought resolution of the issue at the UN Security Council, despite Sheikh Abdullahs opposition to it.[note 5] Following the set-up of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), the UN Security Council passed Resolution 47 on 21 April 1948. The measure called for an immediate cease-fire and called on the Government of Pakistan to secure the withdrawal from the state of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the state for the purpose of fighting. It also asked Government of India to reduce its forces to minimum strength, after which the circumstances for holding a plebiscite should be put into effect on the question of Accession of the state to India or Pakistan. However, it was not until 1 January 1949 that the ceasefire could be put into effect, signed by General Douglas Gracey on behalf of Pakistan and General Roy Bucher on behalf of India.[74] However, both India and Pakistan failed to arrive at a truce agreement due to differences over interpretation of the procedure for and the extent of demilitarisation. One sticking point was whether the Azad Kashmiri army was to be disbanded during the truce stage or at the plebiscite stage.[75]

The UNCIP made three visits to the subcontinent between 1948 and 1949, trying to find a solution agreeable to both India and Pakistan.[76] It reported to the Security Council in August 1948 that "the presence of troops of Pakistan" inside Kashmir represented a "material change" in the situation. A two-part process was proposed for the withdrawal of forces. In the first part, Pakistan was to withdraw its forces as well as other Pakistani nationals from the state. In the second part, "when the Commission shall have notified the Government of India" that Pakistani withdrawal has been completed, India was to withdraw the bulk of its forces. After both the withdrawals were completed, a plebiscite would be held.[77][note 7] The resolution was accepted by India but effectively rejected by Pakistan.[note 8]

The Indian government considered itself to be under legal possession of Jammu and Kashmir by virtue of the accession of the state. The assistance given by Pakistan to the rebel forces and the Pakhtoon tribes was held to be a hostile act and the further involvement of the Pakistan army was taken to be an invasion of Indian territory. From the Indian perspective, the plebiscite was meant to confirm the accession, which was in all respects already complete, and Pakistan could not aspire to an equal footing with India in the contest.[78]

The Pakistan government held that the state of Jammu and Kashmir had executed a standstill agreement with Pakistan which precluded it from entering into agreements with other countries. It also held that the Maharaja had no authority left to execute accession because his people had revolted and he had to flee the capital. It believed that the Azad Kashmir movement, as well as the tribal incursions, were indigenous and spontaneous, and Pakistans assistance to them was not open to criticism.[79]

In short, India required an asymmetric treatment of the two countries in the withdrawal arrangements, regarding Pakistan as an aggressor, whereas Pakistan insisted on parity. The UN mediators tended towards parity, which was not to Indias satisfaction.[80] In the end, no withdrawal was ever carried out, India insisting that Pakistan had to withdraw first, and Pakistan contending that there was no guarantee that India would withdraw afterwards.[81] No agreement could be reached between the two countries on the process of demilitarisation.[note 9]

Cold War historian Robert J. McMahon states that American officials increasingly blamed India for rejecting various UNCIP truce proposals under various dubious legal technicalities just to avoid a plebiscite. McMahon adds that they were "right" since a Muslim majority made a vote to join Pakistan the "most likely outcome" and postponing the plebiscite would serve Indias interests.[82]

Scholars have commented that the failure of the Security Council efforts of mediation owed to the fact that the Council regarded the issue as a purely political dispute without investigating its legal underpinnings.[note 10] Declassified British papers indicate that Britain and the US had let their Cold War calculations influence their policy in the UN, disregarding the merits of the case.[note 11]

Dixon Plan

Sir Owen Dixon, UN mediator

The UNCIP appointed its successor, Sir Owen Dixon, to implement demilitarisation prior to a statewide plebiscite on the basis of General McNaughtons scheme, and to recommend solutions to the two governments.[83][84][85] Dixons efforts for a statewide plebiscite came to naught due to Indias constant rejection of the various alternative demilitarisation proposals, for which Dixon rebuked India harshly.[86]

Dixon then offered an alternative proposal, widely known as the Dixon plan. Dixon did not view the state of Jammu and Kashmir as one homogeneous unit and therefore proposed that a plebiscite be limited to the Valley. Dixon agreed that people in Jammu and Ladakh were clearly in favour of India; equally clearly, those in Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas wanted to be part of Pakistan. This left the Kashmir Valley and perhaps some adjacent country around Muzaffarabad in uncertain political terrain.[87] Pakistan did not accept this plan because it believed that Indias commitment to a plebiscite for the whole state should not be abandoned.[88][89][90]

Dixon also had concerns that the Kashmiris, not being high-spirited people, may vote under fear or improper influences.[91] Following Pakistans objections, he proposed that Sheikh Abdullah administration should be held in "commission" (in abeyance) while the plebiscite was held. This was not acceptable to India which rejected the Dixon plan. Another grounds for Indias rejection of the limited plebiscite was that it wanted Indian troops to remain in Kashmir for "security purposes", but would not allow Pakistani troops the same. However, Dixons plan had encapsulated a withdrawal by both sides. Dixon had believed a neutral administration would be essential for a fair plebiscite.[92]

Dixon came to the conclusion that India would never agree to conditions and a demilitarization which would ensure a free and fair plebiscite.[93][94] Dixons failure also compounded American ambassador Loy Hendersons misgivings about Indian sincerity and he advised the US to maintain a distance from the Kashmir dispute, which the US subsequently did, and leave the matter for Commonwealth nations to intervene in.[95]

1950 military standoff

The convening of the Constituent Assembly in Indian Kashmir in July 1950 proved contentious. Pakistan protested to the Security Council which informed India that this development conflicted with the parties commitments. The National Conference rejected this resolution and Nehru supported this by telling Dr Graham that he would receive no help in implementing the Resolution.[96] A month later Nehru adopted a more conciliatory attitude, telling a press conference that the Assemblys actions would not affect Indias plebiscite commitment. The delay caused frustration in Pakistan and Zafrullah Khan went on to say that Pakistan was not keeping a warlike mentality but did not know what Indian intransigence would lead Pakistan and its people to. India accused Pakistan of ceasefire violations and Nehru complained of warmongering propaganda in Pakistan.[97] On 15 July 1951 the Pakistani Prime Minister complained that the bulk of the Indian Army was concentrated on the Indo-Pakistan border.[98]

The prime ministers of the two countries exchanged telegrams accusing each other of bad intentions. Liaquat Ali Khan rejected Nehrus charge of warmongering propaganda.[note 12] Khan called it a distortion of the Pakistani press discontent with India over its persistence in not holding a plebiscite and a misrepresentation of the desire to liberate Kashmir as an anti-Indian war. Khan also accused India of raising its defence budget in the past two years, a charge which Nehru rejected while expressing surprise at Khans dismissal of the virulent anti-Indian propaganda. Khan and Nehru also disagreed on the details of the no-war declarations. Khan then submitted a peace plan calling for a withdrawal of troops, settlement in Kashmir by plebiscite, renouncing the use of force, end to war propaganda and the signing of a no-war pact.[99] Nehru did not accept the second and third components of this peace plan. The peace plan failed. While an opposition leader in Pakistan did call for war, leaders in both India and Pakistan did urge calm to avert disaster.[100]

The Commonwealth had taken up the Kashmir issue in January 1951. Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies suggested that a Commonwealth force be stationed in Kashmir; that a joint Indo-Pakistani force be stationed in Kashmir and the plebiscite administrator be entitled to raise local troops while the plebiscite would be held. Pakistan accepted these proposals but India rejected them because it did not want Pakistan, who was in Indias eyes the aggressor, to have an equal footing.[101] The UN Security Council called on India and Pakistan to honour the resolutions of plebiscite both had accepted in 1948 and 1949. The United States and Britain proposed that if the two could not reach an agreement then arbitration would be considered. Pakistan agreed but Nehru said he would not allow a third person to decide the fate of four million people. Korbel criticised Indias stance towards a ″valid″ and ″recommended technique of international co-operation.″[102][103]

However, the peace was short-lived. Later by 1953, Sheikh Abdullah, who was by then in favour of resolving Kashmir by a plebiscite, an idea which was "anathema" to the Indian government according to historian Zutshi,[104] fell out with the Indian government. He was dismissed and imprisoned in August 1953. His former deputy, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was appointed as the prime minister, and Indian security forces were deployed in the Valley to control the streets.[105][106]

Nehrus plebiscite offer

Soon after the election of Bogra as Prime Minister in Pakistan he met Nehru in London. A second meeting followed in Delhi in the backdrop of unrest in Kashmir following Sheikh Abdullahs arrest. The two sides agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir.[107] Scholar Noorani says the agreement Nehru reached with Bogra was only an act to quench the Kashmiri unrest[108][note 13] although Raghavan disagrees.[109]

They also agreed informally to not retain the UN-appointed plebiscite administrator Nimitz because India felt a pro-Pakistan bias on Americas part. An outcry in Pakistans press against agreeing to Indias demand was ignored by both Bogra and Nehru who kept the negotiations on track.[110][111]

The USA in February 1954 announced that it wanted to provide military aid to Pakistan. The US signed a military pact with Pakistan in May by which Pakistan would receive military equipment and training. The US president tried to alleviate Indias concerns by offering similar weaponry to India. This was an unsuccessful attempt.[112] Nehrus misgivings about the US-Pakistan pact made him hostile to a plebiscite.[110] Consequently, when the pact was concluded in May 1954, Nehru withdrew the plebiscite offer and declared that the status quo was the only remaining option.[113]

Nehrus withdrawal from the plebiscite option came as a major blow to all concerned.[114] Scholars have suggested that India was never seriously intent on holding a plebiscite, and the withdrawal came to signify a vindication of their belief.[115][119][120]

Indian writer Nirad C. Chaudhuri has observed that Pakistans acceptance of Western support ensured its survival.[121] He believed that India intended to invade Pakistan twice or thrice during the period 1947–1954. For scholar Wayne Wilcox, Pakistan was able to find external support to counter "Hindu superiority", returning to the group security position of the early 20th century.[122]

Sino-Indian War

Main article: Sino-Indian War

In 1962, troops from the Peoples Republic of China and India clashed in territory claimed by both. China won a swift victory in the war. Aksai Chin, part of which was under Chinese jurisdiction before the war,[123][124][125][126] remained under Chinese control since then. Another smaller area, the Trans-Karakoram, was demarcated as the Line of Control (LOC) between China and Pakistan, although some of the territory on the Chinese side is claimed by India to be part of Kashmir. The line that separates India from China in this region is known as the "Line of Actual Control".[127]

Operation Gibraltar and 1965 Indo-Pakistani war

Main articles: Operation Gibraltar, Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, and Tashkent Agreement

Following its failure to seize Kashmir in 1947, Pakistan supported numerous covert cells in Kashmir using operatives based in its New Delhi embassy. After its military pact with the United States in the 1950s, it intensively studied guerrilla warfare through engagement with the US military. In 1965, it decided that the conditions were ripe for a successful guerilla war in Kashmir. Code named Operation Gibraltar, companies were dispatched into Indian-administered Kashmir, the majority of whose members were razakars (volunteers) and mujahideen recruited from Pakistan-administered Kashmir and trained by the Army. These irregular forces were supported by officers and men from the paramilitary Northern Light Infantry and Azad Kashmir Rifles as well as commandos from the Special Services Group. About 30,000 infiltrators are estimated to have been dispatched in August 1965 as part of the Operation Gibraltar.[128]

The plan was for the infiltrators to mingle with the local populace and incite them to rebellion. Meanwhile, guerilla warfare wo.